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PREFACE
In our research on the social implications of technical
development we have found the conception of 'attitude' a use-
ful tool with which to investigate the nature of public pre-
ferences. However, by borrowing this concept from social
psychology, we have also had to familiarise ourselves with
theoretical and methodological issues surrounding 'attitude
theory' in a wider sense. For the social scientists amongst
us this is relatively familiar ground but the physical
scientists and engineers have had more difficulty in placing
the relatively simple model we have adopted within its broader
context of attitude theory, and in acquainting themselves with
some of the problems inherent in social research. This paper
was written as introductory material to help our colleagues
assimilate the attitude approach and thus promote useful inter-
disciplinary interactions.
ABSTRACT
This introduction to attitude theory explores why 'atti-
tude' remains such a central issue in social psychology, and
questions the assumption that attitude has a simple causal
relation with behaviour. Models which relate attitude to
behaviour and the considerable methodological difficulties
involved in empirical work on this topic are discussed. The
paper also describes the relations between attitudes and under-
lying belief systems both in terms of deterministic models and
general principles of cognitive organisation and attitude
change.
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INTRODUCTION
The Basic Questions
The study of attitudes has been of central concern to
social psychology since its earliest days. 'Attitude Theory'
is reviewed at length inevery textbook on social psychology
and investigations are carried out under the umbrella of
'attitude research' throughout the social sciences. The treat-
ment of attitude theory and research in the narrower area of
what we might call academic social psychology can claim to be
a bit more rigorous, in the sense of defining its terms and
setting up controlled experiments, but the assumptions that
lie underneath the study of attitudes and the questions that
we are asking and hoping to solve when we examine people's
attitudes are the same across the board. In this paper I
believe that it would be inappropriate to try and go into the
details of specific attitude theories and the mass of experi-
ments which support or contradict these different schools of
thought. Instead I want to take as my general theme three
basic questions: (1) what have we been trying to find out by
studying 'attitudes'? (2) why have we spent so much time and
energy on this concept 'attitude' somewhat to the exclusion of
related ideas? and (3) can we perhaps remedy this by shifting
attention a little more toward what underlies 'attitude', that
is, 'toward what people believe (their cognitions)? This is an
unorthodox way of approaching an introduction to attitude
theory but I hope that by asking such fundamental questions
attitude theory can be described in a simple, narrative way:
and, further, that attitudes can be related to other psycho-
logical variables without losing the 'wood', which for me is
the study of the social behaviour of socialised humans,
amongst the 'trees' of terminologies and experimental ､ ｡ ｴ ｡ ｾ
Let us begin with the following question: What is it
that social psychologists were trying to explain or predict or
even describe, when they took the term 'attitude' (stance to-
ward) out of general usage and gave it a special role as a
central concept in the study of social behaviour? The term
attitude was not applied to some observable event: an attitude
cannot be observed. It began as a hypothetical construct,
which following the development of satisfactory measurement
became an intervening, latent variable, that is, part of an
imagined model which serves an explanatory purpose in a sequence
between a cause and an effect. This particular 'model' was
invoked to help understand and explain observed patterns or
regularities in social behaviour, in an analogous way to the
use of 'habit' by the iearning theorist to explain observed
patterning of behaviour in a more general sense. It is im-
portant to realise that in a great many respects the 'habits'
of the stimulus-response school (the behaviourists) and the
ｾ ｴ ｴ ｩ ｴ ｵ ､ ･ ｳ Ｇ ｯ ｦ the cognitive-perceptual psychologist and social
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psychologist are very similar ideas. Both are intended to re-
present 'residues of experience' which in turn act as dis-
positions to respond consistently to some object or class of
objects. Combining these two terms we have the idea of
attitude-as-an-acquired-behavioural-disposition. In this sense
attitude was thought to be a precursor of observable behaviour
and be capable of explaining and predicting that behaviour.
The Ecology of Attitude Research
Behaviourists, the majority of whom work with animals and
experimental techniques, can control and design 'experience'
for their animals and observe regularities in behaviour, but
they cannot question them about perceptual experience or in-
tended action. The behaviourist therefore tends to concentrate
on the 'behaviour' end of the sequence and attribute regular-
ities of behaviour to experiences, which in turn the experi-
menters can define through learning processes and the formation
of habits. Cognitive and social psychologists, on the other
hand, the majority (but not all) of whom work with articulate
humans, try to explain or predict the behaviour of socialised
individuals. Such behaviour is often social (that is inter-
actions between individuals) and is usually behaviour with
respect to a socially relevant object or group of people.
Clearly the 'ecology' of this task is quite different. Usually
the social psychologists have relatively little information
about the history of the individuals' experience whether in
general or specifically with respect to the object (the
attitude object) in question; and frequently· observation of
the behaviours is difficult (i.e., very complex, expensive
to study, hypothetical or 'yet to happen'). But the human
subject can be questioned and this is the crux of the differ-
ence in emphasis in the two approaches. Social psychologists
can interview or give questionnaires to their subjects, can
find out what they think or believe about the topic in question,
ask them factual questions about their experience, their past
behaviour and intended behaviour in the future. Using this
'cognitive' material the psychologist tries to build up the
individualqs own picture or point of view of a topic in terms
of the individual's own beliefs and feelings, and the relation-
ships he perceives between the attitude object and other
significant aspects of his world. In this way the psychologist
tries to make some assessment of attitude toward the object;
but even when he has some measure which he calls attitude, can
behaviour be predicted, and can it be even partially explained?
In the vast majority of cases the answer to this is an un-
equivocal 'no'; in other cases it is 'irrelevant', because the
research was not using 'attitude' to predict or explain be-
haviour but studying beliefs and opinions for their own sake
and with no necessary implication for overt action.
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Much of the attitude research that appears in journals
outside academic social psychology is of this latter kind. It
may be concerned with areas of social science as far removed
from each other as market research, politics, clinical psychol-
ogy or anthropology and while, if carefully carried out, can
supply a great deal of factual material, the interpretation of
much of this 'opinion' data has little to do with 'attitude'
or the prediction of behaviour.
In general the concept of 'attitude' has been overworked
and misused and has really explained very little in terms of
general laws of social behaviour. Even within more rigorous
experimental work 'attitude' has become reified as an end in
itself rather than a means to understanding the relation
between the social experience of the individual, the intentions
he forms and the social actions he carries out. Where
'processes' such as attitude change are concerned this concen-
tration on attitude per se can be justif.ied, and I briefly
discuss attitude change in the third section below, but first
and foremost the question of attitude as a means to under-
standing consistencies in behaviour must be explored. There
is a natural progression from this 'behavioural' end of the
process to the second topic of the paper which is an examina-
tion of the relation between attitude and inputs from the
environment, that is, the means by which the history of experi-
ences of the individual, his beliefs about the world, are
organised and translated into attitudes.
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR
Attitude Measurement
I have managed so far to avoid any serious attempt to
define attitude beyond 'residue of experience' and 'acquired
behavioural disposition'. Neither of these is really a defi-
nition of attitude as it is used now. The most common defi-
nition is the 'three component' version according to which
attitude is composed of affective (feeling), cognitive (belief)
and behavioural components. This tripartite definition has
justified measurement of attitude using questionnaires based
simply on a collection of statements which appear to tap one
or more of these three components. For example, questions
directly about feelings, or items which are so emotionally
loaded as to enable the researcher to infer 'feelings' from
respondents' agreement or disagreement. The so-called
cognitive component has usually been tapped by questionnaire
items (belief statements) that lack any obvious emotional
content, and the behavioural disposition component by ques-
tions about previous and intended behaviour or agreement/dis-
agreement with more general statements about behaviour with
regard to the attitude object.
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Most 'attitude' questionnaires are little more than a
cluster of questions which don't hang together, which is an-
other way of saying that when the scores are added up or
averaged they do not really mean a great deal since different
questions are tapping different things. There are, however,
several well established 'paper and pencil' techniques for
measuring attitudes, and a few physiological ones which have
not been well documented. Three of the most commonly quoted
attitude measurement instruments are worth examining here for
the light they shed on the concept of 'attitude'. First,
there is a scaling technique based on the early work of
Thurstone (Thurstone, 1931), who was one of the original
attitude theorists and very much involved in questions of
measurement. The construction of a Thurstone scale involves
collecting or inventing a large pool of statements (or belief
items) about the attitude object and asking a panel of judges
to sort the statements into eleven categories. The basis of
this sorting is what the judges feel to be the degree of
favourableness toward the attitude object implied by each
item. By calculating the 'average' placement for each item
on the II-point scale (represented by the 11 categories) its
average, implied favourability for the attitude object
(average for that particular sample of judges) can be repre-
sented by a scale value. When the questionnaire is admin-
istered to subjects they are asked to agree (score 1) or
disagree (score 0) with each statement. By multiplying the
scale value of each item by either one or by zero (in which
case of course it drops out) an average score can be calculated
for each subject which is, in effect, a measure of his favoura-
bility toward the attitude object. Thurstone in fact defined
attitude in just these terms: "the degree of favourableness
expressed toward the attitude 'object'''. Thurstone also
stated that the overall favourableness which someone might
feel toward an attitude object would give an indication of the
'affective tone' of a range of behaviours performed with
respect to that object, but would not necessarily predict
specific actions.
The second attitude measurement technique, Likert scaling,
(Likert, 1932) is based on a different procedure but also
measures affect, i.e., the favourableness/unfavourableness of
the object in question. Likert, however, puts more weight on
the 'agreeing/disagreeing' response of the subject, that is,
the subject's strength of belief. Here again the starting
point is a pool of items, but in this case the psychologist
himself (by some process of common sense perhaps, or from his
own experience) assigns to each item a value +1 or -1 to re-
present implied favourableness or unfavourableness toward the
attitude object. The subjects whose attitude is being .
measured are then asked to indicate the extent to which they
agree or disagree with the statement on a S-point scale.
These scores are multiplied by either +1 or -1 (as previously
assigned to each item) and the total favourability score is
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simply the sum across all items. Once again the figure at the
bottom of the page is an indication of affect or like/dislike
felt toward the object.
The semantic differential technique (Osgood, Suci and
Tannenbaum, 1957) is rather different from the two scales des-
cribed above but again measures the affective component of
attitude. The method by which the attitude is measured is
fairly easy to describe. The attitude object is printed
above a series of seven-point scales and the ends of each
scale are labelled with adjective-pairs of opposite meaning
such as good/bad or pleasant/unpleasant. The seven points on
the scale represent gradations from one adjective extreme (e.
g., extremely good) to the other (extremely bad). The subject
is asked to 'rate' the attitude object by placing a mark on
one of the seven points of each scale. What is more complex
is the theory underlying this technique. This is the work of
Osgood, an influential social psychologist, who has worked on
attitudes, meaning and attitude change. Osgood was concerned,
initially, with how people understand the meaning of concepts.
He used the method just described to obtain ratings of many
concepts in terms of a large number of adjective pairs, using
a great many individuals from different cultures. He then
used a mathematical procedure based on correlations between
scores obtained for items (factor analysis) to identify the
underlying dimensions which could account for observed patterns
of intercorrelations. He repeatedly found that the same set of
dimensions emerged and called them the 'dimensions of meaning'.
They could be identified by examining the 'type' of adjective-
pair associated with the dimension. Osgood also found that
roughly the same pattern of relative importance amongst these
dimensions was obtained for a given concept even when the
respondents came from different cultures. The three most·
pervasive factors are 'evaluation', 'potency' and 'activity';
and of those the evaluative dimension regularly emerges as the
most important. In other words, usually a large part of the
meaning that any idea or concept has for us is a feeling
reaction of goodness/badness - an evaluation. Osgood equates
this with attitude. This evaluative dimension of meaning (i.
e., attitude) is based on adjective pairs such as like/dislike;
good/bad; wise/foolish; ugly/beautiful; pleasant/unpleasant.
Clearly, there are close links between this measure of attitude
and the overall feelings of goodness/badness tapped by
Thurstone and Likert scales.
All of these scaling methods depend on some assumptions
about what lies underneath attitude. For Osgood (as for just
about everyone else) attitudes are learned, but he specifies
in some detail how attitude or the evaluative aspect of
meaning is attached to concepts as they are learned. The point
I want to make is that the association of 'feeling' or attitude
is construed as an automatic part of concept learning. As we
build up beliefs and higher-order conceptions about the world
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the 'feeling tone' or attitude is developed simultaneously.
It derives from the feelings associated with the beliefs we
are fitting together, and these in turn are based on our actual
encounters with good or bad outcomes (reinforcements in
behaviourist language) in our experience of the world. These
experiences can be direct or learned through the mediation of
language and other people's experience. When measuring
attitude most of the beliefs that are used (the questionnaire
items) are of the kind which link the attitude object, for
example 'bus travel'. with some attribute such as 'convenient'
(which implies favourability) or 'slow' (which implies un-
favourability). But some beliefs are statements of intention,
for example 'I am going to make use of the bus service every
day next week'. Clearly this statement can also be inter-
preted as indicating favourability toward bus travel, and a
subject can be asked to indicate the truth, for him, of the
intention statement. Here the intentional aspect of be-
havioural disposition is being used to measure attitude, but it
is important to note that it is still the 'favourableness'
which is being tapped. Although there was a movement away
from Thurstone's simple definition of attitude as overall
favourability (affect) toward the complex combination of
affect, belief, and behaviour which I have already mentioned,
which implies measurement of all of these aspects in order to
characterise attitude, measurement has always in fact centred
on the affective component. At present there is a tendency
to return to a definition of attitude simply as overall affect
or feeling toward some object; and this affect will, in turn,
depend on the beliefs held about the object.
The Measurement of Behaviour
If we are to try and relate attitudes to behaviour, pri-
marily with the purpose of explaining and predicting the latter,
then there is not much point in refining techniques of attitude
measurement without paying equivalent attention to a definition
of the 'behaviour' we are interested in and how it too might be
measured. This problem can be best appreciated with an example
which is typical of the sort of study carried out in this area,
namely the relation between attitude toward religion and
'religious behaviour'. Let us assume that the attitude has
been adequately measured as overall favourability toward religion,
now what constitutes the behaviour that one might expect to
explain or predict? First, are we going to ask the respondent
a question or a series of questions about his intention in
religious matters, or about his actual performance of 'religious'
behaviours in the past, or are we going to physically observe
him as he goes to church or takes part in religious discussions,
etc.? Second, are we going to try and predict some particular
behaviour (where the level of specificity is quite different
from the generality of the attitude) such as attending a
particular church service on a particular day (single act) or
the frequency with which he attends a particular service
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(repeated observation). Or are we going to try and make some
statement about his future religious behaviour in the sense of
a 'pattern of different behaviours which somehow hang togeth-
er', for example, frequency of attending church, and arranging
religious instruction for his children, and donations of money
to his church, and the number of religious books he has in his
house, and so on-Tmultiple acts).
The problem with such a multiple-act criterion is that
not only do we have to measure many different aspects of reli-
gious behaviour but that we also have to find some logical way
of combining the scores for each aspect. We might well find
ourselves in effect adding 'oranges and apples',our units would
not correspond and the different behaviours may well not hang
together in any way. It is possible, however, to subject a
number of such behaviours to procedures that are the same as
those used to construct an attitude scale from belief state-
ments, and the final result is in effect an attitude scale
based on behaviours instead of beliefs. Notice that here we
have turned the problem around on itself. We have now made a
scale to measure (or predict) a general attitude from a large
number of behaviours. Further, the implication of 'having a
scale' is that there is a clear relation between a general
attitude and behaviour, but behaviour in this one sense - a
coherent pattern based on many different aspects of behaviour.
But the initial problem was phrased in 'the other direction'.
Now when two measures relate in some simple way (that is corre-
late) one can, in theory, make predictions in either direction;
but in practical instances this reversability does not always
solve a given problem. If we want to know about the religious
behaviour of some group, then clearly the effort we have put
into constructing a 'multiple act criterion' or a behavioural
scale of attitude for that group will tell us a great deal .
about that behaviour without any need to measure the attitude
as well; if on the other hand we just measure the attitude to-
ward religion for this group of people and try to read off what
it means by using a religious behaviour scale that had already
been constructed on other individuals we still have (as well as
the question of whether the two groups are equivalent) the
problem of exactly which behaviours will be likely to occur from
among the whole se't - since the demonstrated relationship from
which we are trying to make our prediction is between a general
attitude and a total score across a large number of specific
behavioural items.
The Relation Between Attitude and Behaviour
Quite recently there has been a long-neglected reassessment
of the nature of the relationship between attitude and behaviour
and several reviews of just how successful, or in this case un-
successful, the research in laboratory experiments or 'real life'
has been in demonstrating the prediction of behaviour from atti-
tudes (see for example Wicker, 1969; and several other papers
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reprinted in Thomas, 1971}. For example, beginning with. the
study that is always quoted, that of LaPierre as long ago as
1934 (LaPierre, 1934) we find that he failed to predict the
acceptance of Chinese patrons by hotels and restaurants from
attitudes (or rather, what he called attitudes) to Chinese
people. In another example, this time a typical laboratory
experiment, De Fleur and westie (1958) asked subjects who were
either high or low in prejudice (negative attitude) toward
Negroes to indicate their willingness to pose for a photograph
with a Negro person of the opposite sex. They were then shown
a graded series of seven 'photographic release statements'.
These differed in the amount of publicity that could be given
to the photograph. Subjects were allowed to sign as many (or
as few) of these as they wished and this was taken as an indi-
cation of behaviour. In this case a low, but statistically
significant relationship was found. Variations on this exper-
iment have been carried out several times, usually with no
significant relationship demonstrated between the attitude and
the behaviour. In more applied research· there has been only a
very small degree of success in predicting behaviours such as
absenteeism from work, work performance, or dropping out of
training programmes from measures of attitudes to job or train-
ing programmes.
The reassessment of this work has suggested several reasons
for the poor results, and these explanations fall into two main
groups. On the one hand, there are what are essentially prob-
lems of measurement; and on the other, problems which relate
to the basic theoretical assumption that attitudes and behaviour
are indeed related. First, the question of inappropriate meas-
ures: The reviews of research in this area show quite clearly
that in many cases the so-called attitude measure was in fact
not a measure of affect in the sense used here, indeed it has
ranged from measures of personality to measures of intentions
(for example, LaPierre's study assessed attitude by asking _
'would you accept members of the Chinese race in your establish-
ment?'). The behaviour measures also varied considerably. Some
were intentions rather than actual behaviour (e.g., the photo-
graph release experiment) and the remainder were usually either
single act criteria (e.g., LaPierre) or repeated observations,
for example, Newton & Newton (1950) examined the relationship
between attitude to breast feeding (actually an intention was
measured here too) and observed behaviour in the sense of the
amount of breast milk received by the baby over six feeds. As
might be expected from the earlier discussion of attitude and
behaviour measurement, the more successful studies were those
which measured attitude as overall affect to the object and
predicted behaviour using a multiple behaviour criterion-.--
There are, however, other methodological problems which
have not been mentioned so far and which shade into theoretical
questions. The choice both of the object of the attitude and
the object of the behaviour can vary considerably along a
dimension of generality/specificity, e.g., attitude expressed
to a minority group in general or to a particular sub-group;
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and similarly, behaviours can be with respect to the group as
a whole or (and this is more likely in practice) to specific
members of the group. As one might expect, correspondence be-
tween the levels of specificity of the attitude and behaviour
tend to improve demonstrations of a relationship.
Similar questions of correspondence bring us to a more
fundamental question of whether we should be using general
attitude objects while trying to predict behaviours which are
usually carried out with respect to some fairly specific ob-
ject and certainly carried out (inevitably) in particular cir-
cumstances which must contribute to the specificity of meaning
of the behaviour. Following this line of argument, Fishbein
has suggested (1967) that it is more appropriate to predict
(and try to understand) particular behaviours by measuring,
not the attitude to the object of that behaviour, but instead
the attitude to the behaviour itself, that is feelings of fa-
vourability toward the actual performance of the behaviour in
question, usually carefully defined in terms of the situation
in which it will occur. For example, he suggests that it is
more appropriate to predict the 'use of public transport for
the journey to work in the next month' from the attitude to-
ward 'use of public transport for the journey to work in the
next month' than from attitude toward 'public transport'.
This important insight has considerably improved behaviour-
al prediction in many experimental and 'field' situations rang-
ing from 'gaming techniques' in a social psychology laboratory
to consumer choices of toothpaste brands, voting behaviour in
USA and Great Britain and the off-peak use of suburban bus
services.
Further, and this is crucial for the development of my
argument in the rest of this paper, the shift to attitude-to-
ward-the-behaviour also means a shift in the sort of cognitions
(perceptions and beliefs) which underlie the attitude and there-
fore which influence the behaviour. Instead of considering
attitude as dependent on general attribute beliefs, as in the
case of attitude-toward-an-object (for example, 'Candidate X is
a Liberal'; 'Candidate X is in favour of spending more money on
the National Health Service') we now are concerned essentially
with outcome beliefs. These are beliefs about the expected or
likely (and note that this use of expectation or likelihood is
an indication of the strength of the belief) consequences of
performing the particular behaviour in the situation specified.
To extend the example above, if voting behaviour was being pre-
dicted from attitude to C.andidate X (that is, attitude
to an object), beliefs like those above might be examined.
According to the view taken here, however, it is more appropri-
ate to predict voting from attitude toward the act of 'voting
for Candidate X' and here the beliefs might well be quite
different and imply a different overall direction of favoura-
bility which in turn might imply the opposite voting behaviour.
For example, someone with the attribute beliefs described above
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and who is a Liberal and thinks that spending money on the
National Health Service is 'good' might be expected to have a
favourable attitude toward Cadidate X. But, if his outcome
beliefs about voting for Candidate X are 'voting for Candidate
X will mean throwing away my vote since the Liberal Candidate
has no chance in this constituency'; or 'voting for Candidate
X will increase the chance of the Labour candidate winning
whereas I would rather see the Conservative win (given that
the Liberal cannot) " then one might reasonably expect him to
have a negative attitude to voting for Candidate X and to vote
for someone else.
The topic of underlying beliefs is treated more fully in
the third section below; but to complete my discussion of atti-
tude and behaviour I must first return to the other source of
difficulty in predicting behaviour from attitude. This is less
concerned with how and what is measured and more with the theory
underlying the relation between attitudes and behaviour. I want
to examine this in the more general context of the precursors
of overt behaviour and the formation of intentions.
The Formation of Intentions
Up to this point I have treated intentions simply as either
private beliefs about a projected course of action or a public
statement of this intent. Assuming for the moment that the in-
tention is formed and/or stated close in time to the behaviour
and that no unexpected events intervene to prevent the reali-
sation of the intention, then it follows that, insofar as atti-
tudes are considered as determining behaviour, attitudes can
also be treated as determinants of intention. However, the
previous section has shown that it has proved very difficult
to establish a simple relationship between attitude and be-
haviour. This is in part due to measurement problems, but
several social psychologists are now beginning to take account
of 'other variables' which either influence attitudes or act in-
dependently of attitudes to bring about the observed incon-
sistencies between attitude and the behaviour.
The approach described above which has had most success in
predicting behaviour from attitude-toward-the-behaviour-speci-
fied states that a second factor is also involved. This second
factor depends on the individual's beliefs about the expectations
of other people who are important to him (significant referents).
These often (but not always) influence the formation of an inten-
tion over and above the effect of the attitude; and by measuring
those so-called 'normative beliefs' and including them alongside
attitude-to-the-behaviour a better prediction and a better under-
standing of intention (and behaviour, providing no unexpected
events intervene) can be achieved. This theory also suggests
that the relative influence of the attitudinal and normative
factors will vary with the sort of behaviour involved. For ex-
ample, it has been shown that the choice of toothpaste brand is,
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to a large extent, under the influence of normative pressure
from the expert in question, that is, the dentist, whereas it
has recently been shown that voting behaviour in Great Britain
is barely influenced at all by the expectations of important
social referents. Here, then,we have a clear example of a
theoretical position supported by empirical evidence that in-
tentions (and behaviour) do not necessarily have a simple one
to one relation with attitude alone.
Other theorists who have continued to use the traditional
'attitude-to-the-object' measure have also considered the effects
of additional variables on behaviour. These are often discussed
when experimental prediction from attitude alone has failed and
so far there has been little systematic research on these 'other
variables'. Rokeach and Kliejunas (1972) used, in addition
to ｡ ｴ ｴ ｩ ｴ ｵ ､ ･ Ｍ ｴ ｯ Ｍ ｴ ｨ ･ Ｍ ｯ ｢ ｪ ｾ ｣ ｴ Ｌ attitude-to-the-situation, as a
partial cover for several 'other variables'. Here the behaviour
studied was students' self-report of missing lectures (other
than for reasons of health, bad weather, etc.). Attitude-to-
the-object referred to the 'liking for the teacher' and attitude-
to-the-situation to 'importance of attending the lecture'. In
this case the behaviour was found to be only related to the
'other variable', that is, the 'attitude-to-the-situation', and
not to the liking for the teacher. In the light of the earlier
discussions of inappropriate measures this finding is not unex-
pected. More recently a study of donating bone marrow in hypo-
thetical situations has indicated that 'personal norms' or
'moral obligations' may well have some influence on the forma-
tion of intention, independent of attitude and more general
norms.
The model of intention formation put forward by Fishbein is
quite clear that intentions depend only on attitude-to-the-be-
haviour (based in turn on outcome beliefs) and a general social
norm (which can be split up into more specific normative beliefs
referring to different referents or sources of pressure) and
that all other variables must act through one or other (or both)
of these primary determinants. For example, some unusual as-
pect of the situation might have its effects through beliefs
about the outcomes ｾ ｩ ｶ ･ ｮ that circumstance and hence act
through the attitud1nal variable. Similarly, a sociological
variable such as social class or a more personal factor such as
age might have its influence through the normative variable via
the choice of referent whose pressure was being complied with;
or via the exact nature of the normative belief, for example
a given behaviour may be perceived, through the expectations of
the referent, as appropriate only to a particular age group.
There is much empirical evidence to support this model (e.g.,
Fishbein and Coombs, 1974: Fishbein, Thomas and Jaccard, 1976)
but the formation of intentions may well be dependent on other
factors that are reflected in these two variables, but which
would improve our understanding if we examined them separately.
While this is not the place for speculation it seems to me that
the role of pressure from others is far more complicated than
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would appear from this model; and also ｾ ｡ t .:j,J: is largely
because the model has been used to examine fairly simple be-
haviour in well defined contexts where little or no conflict
is experienced in the formation of the intention that a high
level of success has been achieved with just attitude and simple
normative beliefs. Further, the expectations of important
others will act as a mirror and for example, will reflect the
physical possibilities or impossibilities inherent in a situ-
ation. The question of general physical constraints and other
external criteria on behaviour and the role of volition (the
extent to which the individual can choose which behaviour to
perform) may well turn out to contribute to the formation of
intention and the performance of purposive behaviour.
Two final points are relevant here and link this section
to the remainder of the paper. First, so far my discussion of:
attitude theory has been in deterministic language, as though
the individual behaves automatically in a way which is 'con-
trolled' by the 'residues of his experience' and perhaps the
additional effect of social pressures from important others.
But if we move toward a conception of man forming intentions
which represent plans of purposive, goal-seeking behaviour,
then our approach to the role of attitudes and other factors in
the formation of intentions must be somewhat different. We
must visualise the individual processing information, defining
situations and making choices and decisions in terms of some
ultimate goal; and it is this view of intention formation which
becomes more salient as the complexity of the beliefs and cog-
nitive structures of individuals are explored. Second, 'atti-
tude', whether toward an object or a behaviour, is essentially
the overall feeling associated with some object/behaviour
because of the beliefs held about that object/behaviour at ｾ ｨ ｡ ｴ
moment. Clearly attitude objects will differ enormously in
the complexity and the stability of the beliefs on which they
are based, but attitude is still a sort of evaluative or affec-
tive summary of the cognitive structure associated with the
attitude object. The use of this 'summary', particularly in
restricted circumstances such as an attitude toward a very.
specific behaviour, can be rather uninteresting and contribute
little toward understanding social behaviour. By using this
summary a great deal of information is frequently lost. In
the following section- I want to redeem the earlier simplifica-
tion of 'residues of experience' and the emphasis on the out-
put side of the equation and look instead at the cognitive
(input) side of attitude theory.
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BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES
The Relationship Between Belief and Attitude
As the individual develops he learns of the relationships
between objects in his environment and builds up a version of
the 'outside' world which, insofar as it is based on clear per-
ceptual inputs and direct experience, will largely be veridi-
cal (true to life) because it is based on rational processing
of information. It may, however, be constrained by physical or
social factors which limit his learning experience. He will
also receive information directly from other people and will
further develop his cognitive structure by inferential processes
based on the beliefs he has accumulated. He thus builds up be-
lief systems which enable him to 'go beyond the information
given' in a particular situation and make predictions about
objects, events and relationships which he cannot directly per-
ceive.
The simplest way of treating this topic is to assume that,
through learning processes, we build up a vast number of be-
liefs which relate objects in propositional form (e.g., the
cat is white), and that the strength of such a belief is related
to the strength of the learning process. We can treat this
strength of belief as a probability of the two objects being
related in the stated way and assign to it a value between 0
and 1, for example, a probability of .90 that 'the cat is white'
might be an accurate measurement of a perception of an extremely
dirty white cat. Continuing with this simple example, as more
information is received either by observation, or verbally from
the owner of the cat, or by inference using our previous ex-
perience of the range of colours associated with cats, this. be-
lief may well become stronger and reach virtual certainty. In
this example, the attribute 'white' does not carry a great deal
of affect (feeling) but we can consider further beliefs about
the cat amongst which might be 'the cat is angry' and the 'cat
is vicious'. These are concepts which we have probably learned
in the past in association with unpleasant experiences and thus
carry negative affect (a negative attitudel. The general model
I am describing here suggests that the negative feeling associ-
ated with such concepts will become associated with this 'cat'
to the extent that we believe that it is indeed angry and vicious.
Where the belief is weak, a small amount of negative affect will
be associated with the cat, and where the belief is strong then
this will 'weight' (a mUltiplicative relationship) the amount
of negative affect that is associated with the cat. It is in
this way (although the exact mathematical relations are not
clear) overall affect or attitude toward concepts is built up.
Attitude toward the cat will depend on the beliefs held about
the cat; each belief will associate the cat with an attribute
or other concept which implies some degree of evaluation (this
can be neutral) and this evaluation will accrue to the attitude
object (the cat) in proportion to the strength of the belief.
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As learning proceeds a great many beliefs are formed about
a great many objects and it seems likely that only some of
these (frequently, but not always, those which are most
strongly held), will be available at a given moment as descrip-
tions of an event or attributes of an object. In other words,
we can only process a limited amount of information at a given
time and the beliefs about an object which we are attending to
at that time are called the salient beliefs (probably not more
than 8 or 9 items and frequently less). In the model described
here these are treated as determinants of the attitude. The
affect associated with these determinant beliefs is summed over
the set of salient beliefs to give an indication of overall
attitude.
This type of model, although with different terminology
and different mathematical functions, underlies much attitude
theory. The version used here is that associated primarily
with Fishbein, whose behaviour prediction model was described
earlier, but very similar models have been put forward by other
social psychologists, perhaps most notably by Rosenberg (1956).
Atti tude Change
Since attitudes depend on beliefs and beliefs are 1earned!/,
we assume that attitudes are learned and are the product of an
interaction with our environment (including other people) and
inference processes which, to a large degree, are also dependent
on the information we have previously obtained. It follows that
systematic differences in physical and social environments and
experience are likely to lead (via differing views of the world
to a greater or lesser extent) to different attitudes. .And"
insofar as attitudes (and other beliefs, such as those about
social pressure) underlie intentions and behaviour, groups of
people with different socialisation experiences will tend to
have different behaviour patterns. Further, given the general
assumption about the relation between attitude and behaviour,
new experiences and new information are likely to have some
effect on chanqing these behaviour patterns. A great deal of
social psychology has been concerned with this aspect of compa-
rative attitude research and with attitude change. However,
all too frequently the content of the different belief systems
has taken second place to the study of the attitude (the affect-
ive summary) itself, and the extension of such studies into
observed behaviour change are rare and usually unsuccessful.
Typical experiments in attitude change measure attitude (that
is, agreement with a set of belief statements), then expose the
subjects to information in the form of a persuasive communication,
and then re-measure the attitude. There are virtually no in-
!/There is little evidence that attitudes can be formed
by direct conditioning, most experiments of this kind have in-
volved awareness, that is, the involvement of some beliefs,
during the conditioning process.
-15-
stances (see Thomas and Tuck, 1975) of the monitoring of spe-
cific beliefs during attempts to change attitude. A change in
attitude could be due to changes in those beliefs which have
been shown to underlie the initial attitude and which may be
strengthened or weakened by the comnlunication. It could also
be due to new items of information contained in the communica-
tion entering a revised salient set of beliefs, perhaps dis-
placing an earlier belief directly and/or changing the affect
associated with an earlier belief.
The more traditional area of attitude change research can
be roughly separated into two approaches, the very influential
Yale studies on persuasion and communication (see for example
Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953), and more theoretical studies
on attitude change which reflect models of bel±ef and attitude
organisation. This second approach is discussed later, in the
section on 'Principles of Organisation and Change'.
The Yale programme was centred on examination of which
situational and personality factors would increase or decrease
the effect of communications designed to change attitudes and
opinions (stated beliefs). In other words, how to maximise
the persuasive process. To do this the group studied the effect
on attitudes of different communicators (that is, apparent
sources of the message) with different levels of expertise,
status, trustworthiness, etc. The messages were also varied,
some presented only one side of an argument and others both
sides; some set out to evoke emotional responses and some pre-
sented rational arguments. The audiences too were systemati-
cally studied and changes in attitudes and opinions were rela-
ted to personality measures, self-esteem, cognitive complexity
and many other traits.
The model of persuasion underlying this programme is very
much based on the attention paid to the message and the learn-
ing of its content, followed by a second process of acceptance
(or non-acceptance) of what has been learned. Only when accept-
ance occurs can belief change follow. However, with this two-
phase process some of the experimental variables can end up
having no appreciable effect overall because they differentially
affect each phase. Since the Yale work, McGuire (1969) has pur-
sued this as an explanation for many of the inconsistencies in
the results of this programme and later similar work. For
example, he has suggested that reception of a message (attention
and comprehension) will be greater for high intelligence sub-
jects but that acceptance of (or yielding to) the message will be
less. He therefore concludes that, although both reception and
yielding have linear relationships with intelligence, a combi-
nation of the two produces a non-linear effect such that sub-
jects of both low and high intelligence will show less opinion
change than those of intermediate intelligence.
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The clearest outcome of the Yale programme and more recent
work in the same tradition is that the original questions of
who (communicator), what (messages), to whom (audience) have
produced complex results which at best can be partially un-
ravelled by looking at interactions between effects rather than
simple straightforward effects, and which at worst are just in-
consistent. And this muddled picture applies equally to later
work in the Yale tradition which has tried to follow the effect
of different messages, notably frightening versus non-frighten-
ing communications, on changing actual behaviour in areas such
as dental care, anti-tetanus protection by innoculation, and
giving up smoking. Obviously changing attitudes and behaviour
in these sorts of areas is socially important, but the experi-
ment failed to answer questions about how best to effect change.
In some cases high-fear messages had least effect and this was
attributed to arousing too much anxiety for the message to be
remembered; in other cases, especially when a clear-cut course
of action to avoid the frightening consequences was also pro-
vided (for example, information on exactly how to get anti-
tetanus injections and thus avoid the consequences), then the high-
fear message had most effect.
This last finding ties in with the approach to attitudes,
intentions and behaviour described earlier, that is, when the
message is directed at beliefs about the behaviour, as in the
anti-tetanus experiment, then more behaviour change should
occur. Only if a smoker can be persuaded that cutting down or
giving up smoking will actually reduce his chance of lung cancer
will he change is behaviour. If he just is told that smoking
and lung cancer are related, with no indication that giving up
smoking will have any good effect, then he will be much less
likely to give up smoking. This has been demonstrated in an,
experimental study. If we want to change behaviour then the
message should be aimed at first changing intention, which in
turn requires a change in the beliefs about the outcomes of
that behaviour (or perhaps. in the normative beliefs if these
have already been demonstrated as an important influence on the
behaviour). So far very little work has been done,using this
approach. There is, however, one study which changed the in-
tention and the behaviour of alcoholics with regard to signing-
up for a programme of treatment (McArdle, 1972). The persua-
sive messages were of two kindS, the first aimed at changing
beliefs about the outcomes of signing up (good outcomes) or not
signing up (bad outcomes); the second kind was in keeping with
the earlier experiments on 'fear appeal' emphasising the bad
effects of continued drinking. This fear message had least
effect on changing both the attitude to signing-up for treat-
ment and actual behaviour. The most effective message for
changing attitude and behaviour was the one which linked 'not
signing up' with bad consequences. Notice that, in the terms
of the Yale tradition, this message also produced most anxiety
and least recall of the message, but showed a belief change
(compared with control subjects who received no message at all)
-17-
in the direction of the message, whereas the fear message did
not show a belief change.
Continuing with this theme of attention to the beliefs
underlying attitude and their effect on behaviour, a rather
different approach to changing a behaviour such as smoking is
the technique where'the subjects actively participate either
by taking part in lectures, by giving speeches supporting 'the
other side' (counter-attitudinal) or by role-play, for example
taking the part of a heavy smoker who has just been told that
he has lung cancer. One explanation of the relative success of
participation in changing behaviour is that it forces the sub-
ject to re-think the topic and bring into mind beliefs which
were previously non-salient; it also forms new beliefs by
direct experience of a novel situation. It is likely that the
more involved the subject becomes in the role-play (either
emotionally or in the sense of actually taking part rather
than observing someone else acting), the more belief change
and hence behaviour change will occur.
Similar explanations can be applied to 'counter-attitudinal'
behaviour, which is debating on the side which you do not sup-
port, or consenting to carry out some behaviour that you do not
agree with, either for payment, or to please someone, or because
you have been 'forced to' (see Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959).
But there are other explanations of the changes in attitude
(and beliefs and sometimes behaviour) which occur in such situ-
ations. One of these is that the subject 'observes' himself
doing or saying something that he disagrees with and, in effect,
says "If I am doing this, and there is no other good reason for
me doing it, then I suppose I must believe in it or like it"
and changes his attitude accordingly. But this 'self-attrib-
ution' will depend very much on the 'other good reasons'. "If
he was forced against his will to produce counter-attitudinal
behaviour then he has sufficient reason for having done it and
need not think it due to some personal disposition. In such
instances, in theory, he will not change his attitude. If, on
the other hand, he cannot think of a good enough external
reason he may conclude that it does in fact reflect his own
opinion and thus change his self-attribution and overtly state
an attitude or belief which reflects a change.
This 'self-attribution' explanation was put forward by Bern
(1967) in opposition to Festinger's influential theory of cog-
nitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). According to cognitive
dissonance theory, changes (if any) in attitudes or opinions
which follow 'counter-attitudinal' statements or behaviour are
due to an experience of pressure toward consistency. If we
believe one thing and do or say something different, according
to Festinger, we experience an uncomfortable state of cognitive
dissonance and try to remedy this by making a change; and if we
have already said or done something overtly that is dissonant
with our initial belief or attitude, then the easiest way to
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reduce dissonance is to bring this cognitive element into line
by changing it. The idea of cognitive dissonance or rather the
idea of maintaining cognitive consonance has been considered an
important principle of the organisation of cognitions, attitudes
and behaviour and has produced a great many experimental studies.
Although the details of these and the criticisms they have been
subjected to are beyond the scope of this paper, cognitive dis-
sonance theory is briefly discussed below as one of the con-
sistency theories of cognitive organisation.
Belief and Attitude Systens: Principles of
Organisation and Change
I have very briefly outlined, in an earlier section, a
model according to which information about the world and about
transactions with it can be represented in propositional form
and subsets of these propositions aggregated into more complex
concepts whose substantive content (the actual belief) can be
summarised by an overall evaluation (attitude). This sort of
model is compatible with both stimulus-response and cognitive
views of psychology, but frequently is dismissed as being too
simple to account for the complexities of human belief systems
and behaviour. I want to make just two points on this subject:
First, information processing in propositional form can be
extremely complex by virtue of the large numbers of such units
which the human brain can deal with, certainly over time. The
capacity of the brain is almost always underestimated. Second,
the real value of this 'oatmeal' view rests not only on the
complexity that can arise from sheer numbers but also on the
structures \vhich can thereafter be imposed on that 'oatmeal'
and the processes to which these structures can be subjected.
This is obviously an extremely difficult subject and one we do
not know a great deal about, but certain principles of cognitive
organisation have and are being studied and I want to introduce
some of these here. I shall first deal with general principles
of cognitive organisation, and then the more formalised systems
are explored. .
As beliefs are learned the selection of information from
the environment (including the social environment) is influenced
by the concepts already formed; this is called 'prior entry'
effect. We tend to pay more attention to topics which are of
interest to us and about which we already have some knowledge
or perhaps some anxiety. We tend, to some degree, to select
information which hangs together and we build up interrelated
beliefs and value systems into a 'view of the world' which, at
the most general level, we call ideologies. These may reflect
prior dispositions or even personality traits. This sort of
view of cognitive organisation has been called a 'functional
approach to attitudes'. It does not exclude more objective and
rational processes but allows for considerable individual vari-
ation in the extent to which personality and motivation affect
our belief systems. But more recently the emphasis has shifted.
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There is now considerable evidence accumulating that the inte-
gration of information (beliefs or propositions) and the pro-
cesses by which we use beliefs to infer or predict other be-
liefs can be fairly well mirrored by mathematical models of
information processing, analyses in terms of conditional pro-
babilities and formal logic for which mathematical functions
already exist. These models do not provide an exact fit, an
obvious example is that logic is apparently influenced by "wish-
ful thinking' to some variable extent, but if we think of be-
liefs in this way and measure them as probabilities attached
to propositions (i.e., the likelihood that A is a B), then we
have at our disposal a means for considerably enlarging our
understanding of belief systems.
The assumption which underlies the possibility of mathe-
matical analysis of belief systems is that, to the best of our
abilities, we process information in rational ｷ ｡ ｹ ｳ ｾ ｬ ･ ｡ ｲ ｮ ｩ ｮ ｧ the
probabilities of interrelations between concepts and making
logical inferences. For example, when faced with a decision
we make a probabilistic estimate of the outcomes of each alter-
native. A further example refers to the attitude scales des-
cribed earlier. When faced with a questionnaire made up of a
list of belief statements (for example about attributes of a
political party) some will be beliefs we already hold and can
easily be rated for agreement/ disagreement on the basis of what
we actually know. But when faced with an item that is new, then
a decision to express agreement or. disagreement will involve a
consideration of other beliefs already held about that political
party and inference will be based perhaps on an 'implicit theo-
ry' about the kind of attributes that probably 'go together' in
the political area. This response will reflect 'probabilistic'
(rational) consistency. But if faced with an item about which
we know absolutely nothing, then we have no alternate (other
than a random response or no response) but to make use of a
different principle of organisation, namely evaluative con-
sistency. In other words, we will rate the item in terms of
(or based on) our existing feelings about the political party.
If we like the party (positive attitude) and the item indicates
something good then we will tend to express agreement.
The idea of consistency has been extremely important in
social psychology and several theories, notably Heider's
'Balance Theory' (Heider, 1958), Abelson and Rosenberg's
'Affective-Cognitive Consistency Theory' (Abelson and Rosen-
berg, 1958), and Festinger's 'Cognitive Dissonance Theory' are
based on some notion of internal consistency amongst beliefs
and attitudes and amongst higher order 'subsets' of cognitions.
Consistency is a difficult concept to define. Previously I have
talked about beliefs 'going together' and in very simple language
this does get close to the notion of consistency. Consistency
can be thought of as a condition in which one is able to make
some prediction or inference (possible involving several steps)
from one or more of the elements (beliefs, attitudes, etc.)
concerning other elements in the system, or about the structure
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of the system itself. Probabilistic consistency allows one to
predict relationships on the basis of learned probabilities of
association; logical consistency enables one to predict on the
basis of a set of formal rules; evaluative consistency suggests
inferences based simply on 'good things going together' or
being associated with other good things, bad things being some-
how associated with other bad things, and good and bad things
being disassociated. ---
I cannot possibly do justice to the complexities of con-
sistency theories, but very briefly, Heider's main thesis can
be illustrated by the following example. If I see that Mary
(whom I like) likes Jane (whom I don't know) then I will like
Jane. This is balanced triad; there is Mary and Jane and my-
self and three positive links. The unit between Mary and Jane
could have been some other form of association, such as 'similar
to'. And we need not always be concerned with people only,
thus 'I like Mary; Mary made a dress; I like the dress' is also
a balanced triad. An unbalanced state would occur if, in this
example, I did not like the dress. A balanced state is one
where the relations among the entities fit together harmoniously
and in this case there is no 'force toward change'; but when
relations among entities (which can be translated into 'beliefs
and attitudes') are not balanced then there is pressure to
change. This is where consistency as a principle of cognitive
organisation has implications for attitude change. If some new
event (expressed as a belief or as a feeling) does not fit in a
balanced way with existing beliefs and attitudes then according
to several theorists, belief or attitude change will occur.
Osgood has formalised this idea of 'imbalance leads to change'
in a semi-quantitative way to predict the extent of attitude
change that might be expected in given circumstances. The
affective-cognitive consistency model of Rosenberg and Abelson
is similar to balance theory but more developed. They have
formulated the balance principle in a set of rules; not formal
logical but what they call 'psycho-logic', and by applying
these to relations between cognitions they claim it is possible
to read-off predictions about what sort of cognitive change will
occur.
Experiments have been carried out on all these versions of
consistency theory and there is plenty of evidence that changes
in attitudes and beliefs often do occur when imbalance is
created; but it is difficult to say in advance which sort of
change will occur and in which cognitive element. Also it is
plain that frequently, if not usually, we all exist relatively
happily with many imbalanced belief systems. It is difficult
to conceive of an universal automatic pressure (homeostastis)
toward cognitive balance which can only be avoided by 'not
thinking' about the inconsistency.
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The final consistency theory I want to mention is the one
which has probably stimulated more research than any other single
theory in social psychology: Festinger's cognitive dissonance
theory states that "two (cognitive) elements are in a disso-
nant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of
one element would follow from the other"; for example, if I
believe that smoking causes cancer and I know that I smoke,
then these two elements, which are dissonant, lead to an un-
pleasant or tension producing experience of cognitive disso-
nance. Festinger is more explicit than the other consistency
theorists that dissonance will be greater when there are more
dissonant elements and that, up to a point, dissonance will
be tolerated. Only when dissonance exceeds some threshold will
a change occur, such as giving up smoking or changing to a low-
tar brand. Dissonance theory is supposed to be relevant to
many situations. The 'counter-attitudinal' example has been
described already; another illustration is decision-making
where a choice has to be made between two desired alternatives.
This produces the dissonant cognitions: 'I want X, (but) I have
chosen Y.'. The theory suggests that this dissonance can be
reduced by either decreasing the evaluation of X, the not-
chosen alternative, or increasing the evaluation of Y, the
chosen one.
Dissonance theory has received a lot of experimental sup-
port but the complexities of more recent experiments make it
difficult to interpret the many inconclusive results. While
dissonance theory is similar to the other consistency models it
should be noted that the cognitive elements can be confined en-
tirely to beliefs, even though these are frequently beliefs-
about-attitudes (I know I like smoking) or beliefs-about- be-
having (I know I smoke). This suggests that Festinger's ､ ･ ｾ
finition which centres on "the obverse of one element would
follow from the other" (and no-one has really decided what
obverse means), could well be compatible with 'probabilistic'
and/or logical consistency. In other words, obverse might
refer to "on the basis of any past experience unlikely to
follow from ••. "; or "in terms of strict logic unlikely to
follow from". It seems then that dissonance theory 'may well
turn out to be less a product of evaluative consistency than
are other consistency models. This is in keeping with Bern's
suggestion that cognitive changes which occur in so-called
dissonance experiments can be explained by a self-attribution
process based on beliefs and realistic self-observation. This
explanation again emphasises the importance of information, in-
herent in all situations, and which can be rationally processed
in propositional (or 'belief') form.
CONCLUSIONS
Any attempt to confine the whole topic of attitude theory,
even at the level of an overview, to one relatively short paper
means selection and omission and inevitable bias. But I hope
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that I have at least made my bias explicit and that the (mild)
elements of controversy introduced here will provide 'coat
hangers' on which to hang the vast literature on attitude theo-
ry. To recapitulate, I began by asking two fundamental questions:
What have social psychologists been trying to find out when
studying attitudes? and why has so much time and energy been
given to the study of attitudes somewhat at the expense of be-
liefs? I hope that the narrative approach I have adopted has
nevertheless allowed the answers to these questions to emerge.
Attitude theory was first conceived in the hope of explaining
behaviour but met with little or no success. Meanwhile the
'attitude' concept itself became the topic of research pro-
ducing studies of differential attitudes across groups, and a
great deal of work on the process of attitude change. 'Atti-
tude' as the focus of attention is partly a misnomer because
frequently it was beliefs that were under investigation but in
a non-theoretical 'loose' way, due largely to no real attempt
at definition of belief, and poor belief measurement.
From the perspective of the present climate in social
psychology, I believe it is evident that social and other applied
psychologists have put misplaced emphasis on 'attitude'. 'Atti-
tude' has been used inappropriately and/or measured wrongly and
used to attempt to predict behaviours to which it hardly relates.
But those psychologists who have tried to use attitude within a
strict theoretical framework and attempted to arrive at general
statements about behaviour have found that the only way that
this can be achieved with any real degree of success is by speci-
fying the conditions for behavioural predictions so tightly that
the generality of the law is lost. Attitude itself becomes
reified as the initial cause of the behaviour, rather than a
mediation of important social inputs, that is, the socially
influenced cognitive and perceptual experiences of the individual.
Originally (when the then current movement in psychology was
rigorous behaviourism and avoidance of mentalistic concepts such
as instinct, intentions, and introspection) social psychologists
began the task of describing and explaining social behaviour
from general laws in a way directly corresponding to general laws
in the natural and physical sciences. It seems to me that it is
now time to reassess the role of 'attitude' in the understanding
of social behaviour. To do this we need a different approach
to explanation, one which considers the human subject not as
'behaving' in a way analogous to a laboratory rat but as capable
of forming purposive plans of action (social action in most
cases). Although his 'residues of experience' can to some ex-
tent be measured as 'attitude', and although his intentions are
to some degree dependent on these attitudes, direct and per-
ceptual experiences and the resulting cognitive systems need to
be studied in their own right as reflections of the social en-
vironment of the individual and the society in which he lives;
these are 'fine grain'residues of experience for which attitude
can be no more than an affective summary.
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It is at this point that I return to beliefs. I have
given some indication throughout this paper of the role and
importance of beliefs, the sorts of ways in which belief sys-
tems can be modelled and these models be examined empirically.
More attention can be paid to variations in beliefs, rather
than losing this information by summarising it into 'attitude'.
Retention and study of such local complexity in its own right
will almost certainly require new methodologies. This dis-
aggregate approach suggests a move toward induction from the
beliefs and intentions of individuals to those of groups; and
the aggregation criteria chosen, and the equivalences imposed
on the beliefs will themselves be crucial variables in ex-
planations of social processes and social behaviour.
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